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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000203

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SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: JUBA PEACE TALKS RESUME, LRA

SORTS OUT INTERNAL ISSUES

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

(SBU) Summary: On January 30, the Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA) negotiating team agreed to renew the Cessation of Hostilities for another month and developed a timetable for considering each of the remaining sections of the agreement. In the days prior to the resumption of the talks, a variety of sources indicated that LRA leader Joseph Kony had no intention of surrendering and was looking for funds to relocate and maintain his forces. Meanwhile, LRA members in Garamba National Park reportedly live in fear, which has raised the tension levels within the LRA camp. The LRA negotiating team will travel to Garamba next week to discuss an agreement on the implementing protocol for the accountability and reconciliation agenda item. Closing the gap between the LRA negotiating team at Juba and Kony in Garamba National Park is essential to the process and necessary to build the confidence necessary to successfully conclude a peace deal. End Summary.

TALKS RESUME WITH TIMETABLE

12. (SBU) The Juba Peace Talks resumed on January 30. Senior Advisor Tim Shortley attended and the U.S. and European Union were named as official observers by mediator Riek Machar. The Government of Uganda and the $\overline{\text{LRA}}$ agreed to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) to February 29. parties also came up with a timetable to consider the remaining agenda items. The parties will meet together on February 1 to discuss the implementing mechanism on accountability and reconciliation. After coming to agreement, the LRA hoped to travel to Garamba to discuss it with Kony on/about February 4. If Kony concurs, then the protocol could be signed during the week, according to Senior Advisor Shortley. The other two agenda items, a cease-fire and the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration, and reinsertion pieces of the "Final Peace Agreement" could be negotiated the following two weeks, according to the timetable.

LRA MEMBERS TERRORIZED IN GARAMBA

13. (C) Prior to the restart of the talks, a variety of sources expressed concern about Kony's commitment to peace. Yusuf Adek, one of LRA leader Joseph Kony's childhood friends, met with Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Shortley on January 26. Adek had been named recently to the LRA's negotiating team and had just returned from Rikwangba

after meeting with Kony. Adek confirmed that Kony was set on making money to "run his organization and run/relocate if necessary." Adek said that Kony was not interested in meeting or talking with anyone anymore and wanted to find a safe place to go. Adek said that LRA members in Garamba were terrorized and demoralized.

- 14. (C) The LRA negotiating team waited several days to see Kony, from January 10 to 14. Caesar Acelam was sent from Kony to the delegation with messages explaining Kony's absence. When the team finally saw Kony, they walked over eight miles to reach him. Acelam's role as messenger intrigued our British colleagues, because of the information throughout November and December that Acelam was backing the defections. Acelam told LRA delegation members Santa Okot and Yusuf Adek and Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) member Dennis Okirot separately that he was under duress. He was now again under a form of house arrest and being kept close to Kony. They speculated that Kony knew about Acelam's encouragement of the defections. Acelam asked Santa Okot to help him. He told her that Kony was planning to move to Central African Republic. Adek said that Acelam did not believe he would survive. Acelam no longer has a telephone.
- 15. (C) Other LRA negotiating team members and defectors corroborate Adek's description of the fear within the LRA camp inside Garamba. Recent defectors Captain Sunday Otto, Vincent Okema, and Ojok Alex remain in communication with friends in Garamba. Otto and Okema, who are working with the Ugandan military and MONUC, are waiting to be re-inserted into Garamba to assist 18-30 defectors waiting near Kiliwa. They also told us on January 28 that Acelam was under close watch and that most of the LRA remaining in Garamba, with the exception of the hard-core inner ring around Kony, feared

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being killed like Otti, and wanted to escape.

LRA DELEGATION

16. (C) Several contacts reminded us that newly-named LRA delegation leader David Matsanga was from eastern Uganda. As a result, he would not have the confidence of northern religious and local leaders. Matsanga was afraid to go to Rikwangba and stayed behind in Juba. Kony informed him by telephone that he would replace Martin Ojul at the head of the delegation. The LRA consultation with 300 or so Ugandans was placed on hold, according to GOSS Secretariat personnel.

PLAN B

17. (C) Ugandan People's Defense Forces Chief of Defense Forces General Aronda believes the new delegation was playing for time for Kony, who has spread out his forces. He stated to P/E Chief and Shortley that Matsanga would not sign an agreement quickly. Aronda said that there was no progress made with Congo regarding joint operations agains the LRA at the Chiefs of Defense Forces meeting of Tripartite countries on January 27 and 28. He blamed competing communiques and multilateral and bilateral summits for taking the focus off dealing with the negative forces in the region. Surprisingly, Aronda was not confident that a military operation would necessarily resolve the LRA problem. Aronda asserted that Matsanga and Kony want money from Government of Southern Sudan mediator, Riek Machar to enable Kony to find a safe place for his group.

18. (C) The GOU, the African observers, and Machar believe that if enough momentum is generated in the Juba process, it could help bridge the gap between Kony and his negotiating team. In addition, compressing the timetable would keep the LRA focused on the agenda, rather than personal perks. Getting Kony to articulate what he needs out of the agreement to be secure remains a key objective of the current exercise and essential to achieving a final peace agreement. CHRITTON